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n STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A) NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves determination of Idaho taxable income for the years 2003 and 2004 
Appellant Kathy Parker (hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. Parker") and Appellant David Parker 
(hereinaiter referred to as "Mr. Parker") filed their federal income tax return as "Married, Filing 
Jointly." As a result, Idaho law mandated that the Parkers file as "married filing jointly" with 
Idaho. Because Mr. Parker was a Nevada domiciliary and Mrs. Parker an Idaho domiciliary, Mrs. 
Parker reported her wages and the Idaho sourced income. Respondent Idaho State Tax 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as "Tax Commission") subsequently determined that the 
Parkers owed additional Idaho income tax resulting from inclusion of one-half of Mr. Parker's 
Nevada wages. In achieving this result, the Tax Commission relied upon its interpretation and 
combination of Idaho tax and community property law. The District Court, Honorable Ronald J. 
Wilper, Presiding, upheld the Tax Commission's Amended Decision and the instant Appeal 
ensued. 
B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
For the contested taxable years, the Parkers filed their federal income taxes as "married 
filing joint." (77 of Stipulated Facts). Because they had filed as such at the federal level, Idaho 
law mandated that the Parkers file an Idaho married, filing joint return; they did so and reported 
only Mrs. Parker wages as an Idaho domiciliary. (778 and 9 of Stipulated Facts). The Idaho tax 
returns did not report any wages eamed by Mr. Parker as a Nevada domiciliary. (710 of 
Stipulated Facts). 
The Audit Division of the Tax Commission audited the returns and concluded that one- 
half of Mr. Parker's income was subject to Idaho income tax. (7713 and 14 of Stipulated Facts). 
The parties also stipulated that the Parkers did not act with any fiaudulent intent. (716 of 
Stipulated Facts). As a result, the Tax Commission issued aNotice of Deficiency. (7715 and 17 
of Stipulated Facts). In response to a Petition for Redetermination, (7718 and 19 of Stipulated 
Facts), the Tax Commission held an informal conference on 18 July 2007. (720 of Stipulated 
Facts). Thereafter the Tax Commission issued its Decision, (721 of Stipulated Facts), which it 
sua sponte determined to contain a clerical error which it corrected in the Amended Decision 
issued on 3 January 2008.7722 and 23 of Stipulated Facts. The Amended Decision upheld the 
Notice of Deficiency Determination; to wit: one-half of the wages earned by Mr. Parker while he 
was domiciled in Nevada was subject to Idaho income tax. (724 of Stipulated Facts). The Tax 
Commission, sua sponte, also determined that one-half of interest income fiom an Idaho 
institution should be apportioned, based on community law principles, one-half to Mr. Parker in 
Nevada and one-half to Mrs. Parker in Idaho, rather than all being reported to Idaho as Idaho 
sourced income. The end result of the Amended Decision was that 100% of Mrs. Parker's Idaho 
wages and 50% of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages were taxed by Idaho. 
- 
On 22 February 2008 the Parkers filed their Petition for Judicial Review of Idaho Tax 
Commission Amended Decision. (R, Vol. I, Pg. 5-8). On 14 March 2008 the Tax Commission 
filed its Answer. (R, Vol. I, Pg. 9-22). 
The parties then agreed to submit the matter to the District Court on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with the Tax Commission requesting the right to further address the nature of, and to 
what extent, if any, of Mr. Parker's contacts with Idaho. 
On 24 June 2008 the Tax Commission filed the Stipulated Facts, together with three 
exhibits: (1) the Notice of Deficiency Determination; (2) the Protest Letter sent on behalf of the 
Parkers; and, (3) the disputed Amended Decision. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 22A-22U). On 1 July 2008 the 
Parkers filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. Vol. I, Pg. 23-24), and Affidavit of Mr. 
Parker in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. Vol. I, Pg. 25-27). In response, on 18 
July 2008, the Tax Commission filed an Affidavit of Jim Gunter Regarding Summary Judgment, 
(R. Vol. I, Pg. 28-34). On 1 August 2008, the Parkers responded with their Motion to Strike 
Portions of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 35-36). 
After hearing oral argument, and taking the matter under advisement, the District Court 
issued in a single document, on 23 October 2008, its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Strike, Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment'. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 37-46). 
On 10 November 2008 the Parkers timely filed their Notice of Appeal to this Court. (R. Vol. I, 
Pg. 47-49). The Tax Commission did not Appeal the denial of its Motion to Strike. 
On 2 January 2009 the Parties filed a Stipulation to Include Additional Information in 
Clerk's Record. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 56-57). On 5 January 2009 the District Court entered its Order to 
Include Additional Information in Clerk's Record, (R. Vol. I, Pg. 58-59), which added the 
Parties' Stipulated Facts appearing in the Record, Pages 22A-22U. 
'On 21 November 2008 the District Court entered a Final Judgment. (R. Vol.1, Pg. 50- 
52). 
C )  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts involved in this case may be gleaned from the Parties' Stipulated Facts, the 
Affidavit of David Parker and the uncontested portions of the Affidavit of Jim Gunter. Because 
the Parkers appealed the denial of their Motion to Strike portions of Jim Gunter's Affidavit, none 
of the challenged Paragraphs have been discussed. The Tax Commission did not appeal the 
denial of its Motion to Strike the Affidavit of David Parker. 
Although Mr. Parker and Mrs. Parker were technically married at all times during the 
taxable years at issue, (72 of Stipulated Facts), they had physically separated for all purposes in 
November 2000, (72 of David Parker's Affidavit). Consequently, Mr. Parker was a Nevada 
domiciliary, (74 of Stipulated Facts), and Mrs. Parker an Idaho domiciliary during the challenged 
taxable years. (73 of Stipulated Facts). 
Since their November 2000 separation, Mr. Parker never received any financial assistance 
or benefit, either directly or indirectly, from either Mrs. Parker or her Idaho income. (72 of David 
Parker Aff~davit). His income was sufficient to meet all of his fmancial obligations without any 
financial assistance from Mrs. Parker. (73 of David Parker Affidavit). And finally, during the 
taxable years, Mr. Parker testified that he had not received any Idaho-sourced income, either as 
wages, dividends or from the sale property. (76 of David Parker Affidavit). 
For the challenged taxable years, the Parkers filed their federal income taxes as "married 
filing joint." (77 of Stipulated Facts); as an unintended consequence, the Parkers were required 
by Idaho law to file as "married filing joint" with Idaho. Because Nevada does not impose an 
individual income tax, the Parkers only the wages earned by Mrs. Parker while an Idaho 
domiciliary. (nv and 9 of Stipulated Facts). The Idaho tax returns did not report any income 
earned by Mr. Parker as a Nevada domiciliary. (710 of Stipulated Facts). 
m ISSUES PRESENTED 
The central issued asks this Court to decide whether or not the District Court erred in 
upholding the Tax Commission's determination that one-half of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages 
were subject to Idaho income tax. Subsidiary to this issue are the issues of: (I) whether the 
District Court erred in refusing to strike certain portions of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit; (2) whether 
the District Court erred when it held that Mr. Parker had contacts sufficient enough with Idaho to 
satisfy the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United States 
Constitution; (3) whether the District Court erred in holding that the Tax Commission's 
interpretation of Idaho resident income tax principles and community law principles did not 
violate either the Due Process or Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution; and, (4) 
whether the District Court erred in failing to interpret LC. 563-3002 as automatically including 
Internal Revenue Code provisions providing income tax relief resulting fiom application of 
community law principles. 
Im ANALYSIS 
A) THE! DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
Relating to the Parkers' Motion to Strike 7 22 through 724 of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit as 
irrelevant, the District Court held that these statements were relevant to determination of Mr. 
Parker's insufficient contacts with Idaho. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 39). The District Court held that the 
other challenged statements either reflected the Tax Commission's legal analysis or represented 
Mr. Gunter's opinion based upon evidence to which the parties stipulated. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 39-40). 
The District Court discussed the community property issue only briefly when it 
summarily wrote that, in Idaho, all property acquired after marriage by either the husband or the 
wife is presumed to be community property. (R.Vo1. I, Pg. 42). Therefore, with the District Court 
having granted S m m  Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission, the Parkers assume that the 
District Court &ed the Tax Commission's analysis of community law principles: 
"There is no indication of any writing between the spouses which would 
preclude the general rules of the community property laws of the two 
states from governing the ownership of the income in question. There also 
is no indication that any of the income-producing property is other than 
community property. Therefore, the Commission that the community 
property laws should govern the ownership of the income in question. 
Accordingly, the Commission finds that the auditor's inclusion of one-half 
of all of the income of the community is proper." 
Tax Commission Amended Decision, (R. Vol. I, Pg. 22R-22s) 
Regarding the Parkers' argument that LC. 863-3002 incorporates the equitable relief 
provisions of I.R.C. $6015(f) and I.R.C. 566(c), the District Court characterized these provisions 
as an "exemption" which must be created by clear and concise legislative language, not through 
inference or implication. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 42). The District Court also held that the Compromise 
and CIosing Provisions, LC. $563-3047 and 63-3048, provide taxpayers, such as the Parkers, a 
mechanism for relief in situations such as this. 
Regarding the Due Process challenge, the District Court held that the Mr. Parker had 
contacts sufficient enough with Idaho to subject him to Idaho income tax. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 43). The 
basis for this conclusion appears to be the District Court's finding that Mr. Parker had an interest 
in income producing property located in Idaho and that one-half of the marital community was 
located in Idaho. a. 
Regardimg the Commerce Clause challenge, the District Court summarily concluded that 
the Tax Commission's actions had fairly apportioned the income tax because Mr. Parker was not 
actually subjected to double taxation since Nevada did not impose any income tax. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 
44). As a result the District Court concluded that it could not render an advisory opinion on the 
Tax Commission's actions. a. 
Bj THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ST= PORTIONS OF MR. 
GUNTER'S AFFIDAVIT 
As the District Court correctly noted, the determination of admissibility regarding 
testimony proffered in connection with a Motion for Summary Judgment is reviewed by this 
Court for an abuse of discretion. McDaniel v. Inland Nortkwest Rental Care Group-Idaho, 144 
Idaho 219,222,159 P.3d 856 (2007). The analysis has three components to it: (1) whether the 
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standard applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and, (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 1000 
(1991). 
Through a contemplative review of the District Court's Decision, it appears that, although 
the District Court reviewed Mr. Gunter's statements, it did not rely upon many of them in 
rendering its Decision. Consequently, the Paxkers do not address the District Court's denial of 
their Motion to Strike relative to those challenged paragraphs. 
The Parkers do appeal the District Court's denial of their Motion to Strike 724 of Mr. 
Gunter's Affidavit as stating legal conclusions; the Parkers also objected that 1/24 was 
speculative. Paragraph 24 stated Mr. Gunter's conclusion that the taxable income of Western 
Land and Development, LLC, and KPGMJC Investments would have given Mr. Parker an Idaho 
filing requirement for the taxable year 2003. This cIearly represents a legal conclusion for the 
court to make and, therefore, should be stricken. Also, Mr. Gunter's conclusion that the taxable 
income of RCMP Investments, LLC, would likewise have imposed upon Mr. Parker an Idaho 
income tax filing requirement for 2004 should be stricken for the same reason that it constitutes 
an impermissible legal conclusion to be made by the court. Alternatively, both conclusions 
should be stricken as being speculative because 1/24 states thak " ... it appears ..." Such 
terminology clearly identifies the speculative nature of Mr. Gunter's conclusion. Therefore, the 
Parkers respectfully submit that 1/24 of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit should be stricken for the separate, 
independent reasons that it represents a legal conclusion for the court, and is speculative in 
nature. 
C) THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CHARACTERIZING I.R.C.66015 AS AN 
"EXEMPTION" 
The District Court denied the application of I.R.C. §66(c) and 6015 because it 
characterized their application as an exemption. See District Court discussion at Page 42 of 
Record. And, as such, it must be created or conferred in clear and plain language and cannot be 
created out by inference or implication. Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335,393 P.2d 35 (1964). The 
District Court, then concluded its discussion on this point by stating I.C.@63-3047 and 3048 
provides for relief in this type of situation. See Page 43 of Record. 
With all due respect, the Parkers submit that I.R.C. $6015 does not constitute an 
"exemption" which, in normal tax parlance, refers to various amounts excluded from calculating 
gross income which is the starting point for determining taxable income. Black's Law Dictionary 
612 (West, S'b Ed. 2004 ). Rather, I.R.C. $6015 provides for equitable relief from the actual 
calculated tax resulting &om community law principles. Rather, $6015 provides for equitable tax 
relief resulting from inclusion of certain income items resulting from application of community 
law principles. Consequently, incorporation of I.R.C. $6015 principles into Idaho tax law more 
closely resembles Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 142 Idaho 790,796, 
134 P.2d 641 (2006) where this Court adopted the federal elements for tax fraud because Idaho 
had no corresponding tax fraud provision. 
As our starting, it is undisputed that the calculation of net income subject to Idaho state 
income tax begins with federal "taxable income," I.C. $63-301 1B. Then it is modified by Idaho 
adjustments. I.C. $63-301 1C. And, unless there is specific Idaho law dealing with a particular 
issue, then the Commission and Appellants look to federal law because that is what the Idaho 
Legislature specifically intended. I.C. $63-3002. 
Treas. Reg. $1.6015-1(0 directs that in determining whether relief is available under 
$1.6015-4, items of income, among others, are generally allocated to spouses without regard to 
the operation of community property laws. In turn, $1.6015-4(c) states that "[flor guidance 
concerning the criteria to be used in determining whether it is inequitable to hold a requesting 
spouse jointly and severally liable under the this section, see Rev. Proc. 2000-15 (2000-1 C.B. 
447) ..." This relief is applicable for all returns filed on or after 18 July 2002. $26 CFR 1.6015-9. 
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 supercedes Rev.Proc. 2000-15, Rev.Proc. 2003-61, Section 
3, and provides guidance for taxpayers, such as the Parkers, seeking equitable relief from income 
tax liability under section 66(c) or section 6015(f), the section Appellants are relying upon. 
Section 4 provides the general conditions for relief. Section 4.01 states, in relevant part, 
that "With the exception of conditions (1) and (2), a requesting spouse must satisfy all of the 
following threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for relief under section 66(c). 
The Service may relieve a requesting spouse who satisfies all the applicable threshold conditions 
set forth below of all or p'art of the income tax liability under section 66(c) or section 60150, if, 
taking into account all the facts and circumstances, the Service determines that it would be 
inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the tax liability." 
Subpart 01 then identifies the threshold conditions as: (1) the requesting spouse filed a 
joint return for the taxable year for which relief is sought; (2) relief is not available to the 
requesting spouse under $601 5(b) or (c); (3) the requesting spouse applied for relief no later than 
2 years afker the date of the Service's, in this case the Commission's, first collection activity; (4) 
no assets were transferred between the spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme by the spouses; (5) 
one spouse did not transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse; (6) the requesting spouse 
did not file or fail to file the return with fraudulent intent; and, (7) the income tax liability from 
which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of individual with whom the 
spouse filed the joint return, unless the item is attributed to Mr. Parker solely due to the operation 
of community property law in which case, for purposes of the Revenue Procedure, that item will 
be considered to be attributable to the non-requesting spouse. 
Revenue Procedure Section 4.03 also applies to requesting spouses (Mr. Parker) who 
filed a joint return, seek relief under section 6015, and satisfy the threshold conditions of 
Revenue Procedure Section 4.01, but do not qualify for relief under section Revenue Procedure 
4.02(under-payments on joint returns). 
Section 4.03(2) then identifies a number of factors that may be relevant in determining 
whether or not to grant equitable relief. These factors are nonexclusive and the real inquiry is 
whether, taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitabIe to hold the requesting 
spouse liable for all or part of the unpaid tax liability, or deficiency, and whether full or partial 
equitable relief under section 66(c) or section 60150 should be granted. No single factor will be 
determinative of whether or not to grant relief in any particuIar case. 
Idaho Code 5863-3047 and 3048 do not provide adequate relief in this type of situation. 
As borne out recently in the local media, these provisions grant the Tax Commission the 
authority to settle income tax penalties and/or income tax IiabiIities on an ad hoc basis without 
any controlling andlor guiding principles or rules. Without such, it is reasonable to expect that 
cases with similar factual settings are not treated equally. In distinction, the Parkers' situation 
requires a consistent application of the law so that all taxpayers similarly situated are treated the 
same. As we wrap up our discussion on this issue, we must remember that the Idaho Legislature 
specifically intended to incorporate federal law when there was no corresponding applicable 
Idaho law. In this case we are looking for income tax relief resulting from artificial application of 
community law principles. We seek income tax relief resulting from inclusion of Mr. Parker's 
wages on equitable grounds that it is fundamentally unfair to subject his wages to Idaho income 
tax when this income is neither Idaho sourced, nor was he an Idaho domiciliary or otherwise 
physically resided in Idaho. 
D) THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TAX COMMISSION'S 
METHOD OF INCLUDING MR. PARKER'S INCOME DID NOT VIOLATE EITHER THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OR THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
To start this analysis, we believe it helpful to repeat the operative facts. At all relevant 
times, Mr. Parker was a Nevada domiciliary. Mr. Parker did not have any Idaho-sourced wages 
or income. In calculating the Parkers' Idaho laxable income, the Tax Commission started by 
taking 100% of Mrs. Parker's Idaho wages and then added 50% of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages. 
The Tax Commission then, sua sponte, determined that certain interest income, rather than being 
entirely taxed by Idaho since it was Idaho-sourced, should be split 50-50 based upon community 
law principles. And finally, in reading the District Court's Decision, it appears that the District 
Court seized on this and concluded that Mr. Parker had the requisite sufficient minimum contacts 
with Idaho which, in reality, resulted solely from the Tax Commission's interpretation of 
community law principles. 
1) THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
Regarding the Parkers' Due Process challenge, the District Court stated that "[tlhe Due 
Process Clause requires a minimum connection between the state and the person it seeks to tax. 
(Citation omitted)." (R. Vol. I, Pg. 43). The District Court then wrote that the United States 
Supreme Court had held in ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307,3 15 (1982) 
that the inquiry is whether "the tax bears a financial relationship to the 'protection, opportunities 
and benefits given by the state."' a. The District Court then phrased the Due Process issue as 
whether "[tlhe simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which 
it can ask return. (Citation omitted)." &. The District Court concluded that, because of Mr. 
Parker's community property interest in Idaho income producing property, and having one-half 
of marital communitf located in Idaho, sufficient minimum contacts existed with Idaho and, 
therefore, the income tax was fairly related to the services provided to the resident spouse." (R. 
Vol, I, Page 44). 
The Parkers respectfully submit that the District Court failed to fully consider and 
understand the limitations imposed by ASARCO, supra, and the subsequent case of Container 
Corp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tar Board, 463 U.S. 159,103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983), on the power of 
the various states to tax income generated fkom out-of-state activities. Accepting for the sake of 
ar,oument that Mr. Parker could be taxed for income generated from property located in Idaho, it 
is clear fkom ASARCO, Container Corp. and others, that Idaho cannot tax income generated fkom 
discrete out-of-state activities when such income generating activities have, in any business or 
economic sense, nothing to do with activities in the taxing State. As will be seen below, this is 
just a mere effort to reach profits earned outside of Idaho which violates Due Process. The 
"protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state," referenced by the District Court, 
address the protection, opportunities, and benefits give by the state as they relate to the income 
2Parkers submit that this characterization is erroneous. As is clear from such cases as 
Armstrong v. Armsirong, 350 U.S. 568,577 (1 956) and the multitude of cases following it, the 
fiction of a "marital domicile" has little or no force in the United States. It is not clear what the 
District Court means by this phrase. The Parkers submit that individuals have domiciles, not 
"marital communities" which is, after all, a term which describes property rights among married 
persons, not the persons themselves. At the most, the Parkers respecmly submit this phrase can 
be read only to be a synonym for the phrase "one of the marriage partners is domiciled in Idaho." 
Marriage is not, as discussed further in@, a business relationship (such as a corporation which 
may be present and have offices everywhere but is "domiciled" in one place), but a legally 
recognized personal relationship. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed. 1999). 
generating activities of the taxpayer. 
2) IDAHO MAY TAX INCOME GENERATED BY OUT-OF-STATE ACTMTIES 
ONLY WHEN THEY ARE PART OF A UNITARY BUSINESS 
As a general principle, Idaho may not tax value earned outside its borders. See, e.g., 
Connecticut GeneralLife Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77,303 U. S. 80-81 (1938). This 
prohibition can be breached only where the out-of-state, income generating activity being taxed 
is part of a unitary business. In the case preceding ASARCO, the Supreme Court was dealing with 
a business, Mobil Oil Corp., which was a clearly unitary business. Mobil Oil Corp. v, 
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,438 (1980). Mobil was a unitary business which engaged 
in all aspects of the oil business including, without limitation, exploration, dn'lling, extracting, 
refining, and the selling of petroleum and petroleum products. Each of the subsidiary 
corporations and businesses providing Mobil with income was likewise engaged in the oil 
business and carried out the same kinds of activities both within the taxing state and without. As 
will be seen below, the Parkers cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be characterized in l i e  
fashion. 
In subsequent cases, including ASARCO, the states involved attempted to shoehorn all 
kinds of businesses into the unitary business mold. In ASARCO, for instance, the state of Idaho 
argued that the purpose statement of a business alone sufficed to establish the business as a 
unitary business. The ASARCO Court, however, strongly disagreed: 
"We cannot accept, consistently with recognized due process standards, a 
definition of "unitary business" that would permit non-domiciliary States to 
apportion and tax dkidends "[wlhere the bb;siess activities of the dividend payor 
have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State. . . ." 
[citing Mobil Oil Corp., infia]. In such a situation, it is not true that 'the state has 
given anything for which it can ask return'." 
ASARCO, supra, 458 U.S. at 326. Note that the Supreme Court's focus in this, as in other cases, 
is on the activities of the parties outside the state and their relationship to the activities of the 
entity within the taxing state, and not on the mere existence of a relationship or on the presence 
of one of the parties to the relationship in the taxing state. 
In a later case, Container Corp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 
(1983), the Supreme Court reinforced its holding in ASARCO by holding that, under both the Due 
Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a state may not, when imposing an income- 
based tax on a party, tax value earned outside its borders except in the case of a more or less 
integrated business enterprise operating in more than one state." Id. at Page 164. Even in those 
cases, it is fair to do so only because some of the income generating activity spans the states, and 
because in these circumstances: 
"[Sleparate accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in 
various States, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting fkom 
functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. 
[Cites omitted.]" 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,438 (1980). "Even then, arriving at 
precise territorial allocations of value is often an elusive goal." ASARCO, 458 US., at 164. The 
ASARCO Court is clear: 
"For a state to tax income arising out of interstate activities, the out-of-state 
activities of the purported 'unitary business' must be related in some concrete way 
to the in-state activities, and the functional meaning of the requirement is that 
there be some sharing or exchange of value not capable of precise identification or 
measurement, beyond the mere flow of funds arising out of passive investment or 
distinct business operation which renders formula apportionment a reasonable 
method of taxation." 
Id. at Page 166. 
As will be seen, not only do the Parkers not constitute a "unitary business", or a business at all, 
there is no relationship between the out-of-state income generating activities of Mr. Parker, a 
non-resident whose income Idaho seeks to tax, and the in-state activities of Mrs. Parker. 
3) MR. PARKER IS NOT AN IDAHO RESIDENT WHOSE NEVADA INCOME CAN BE 
TAXED BY IDAHO. NOR DOES THE PARKERS' MARITAL COMMUNITY CONSTITUTE 
A UNITARY BUSINESS OR OTHERWISE. 
As discussed supra, the ASARCO Court recognized that activities which are a part of a 
business that adds to the riches of the corporation but do not affect the taxing State's part of the 
business is not a sufficient ground to increase tax. The State cannot tax discrete out-of-state 
activities that in any business or economic sense have nothing to do with activities in the taxing 
State. This is just a mere effort to reach profits earned elsewhere and violates Due Process. See 
discussion supra. If this is true of a business, how much more true can it be where no business is 
involved, but rather a right to allocation of property earned by individuals in a marriage, such as 
the Parkers. 
First, it should be noted that the Tax Commission does not appear to argue that it would 
be able to impose an income tax on Mr. Parker's Nevada income standing alone; i.e., were he not 
married to Kathy Parker during the relevant years. As the Parties stipulated, he was not an Idaho 
domiciliary during the years at issue. Not only was he not a resident of Idaho, he did not work in 
Idaho at all. The Tax Commission might well seek to impose an income tax on him for any 
income generated by any income producing property he might have owned in Idaho, though the 
Parkers need not argue here the validity of such a tax nor do they concede it. It is only the fact 
that the Parkers were compelled to file with Idaho as "married filing jointly" because of their 
federal filing in the years at issue that brings these questions to the fore. The Parkers respectfully 
submit that the fact of their marriage does not permit Idaho to tax the Nevada wages anymore 
than it could have done so under other circumstances. 
To begin with, consistent with ASARCO, the out-of-state income generating activities of 
Mr. Parker cannot be taxed as the marriage of the Parkers did not constitute any kind of business, 
much less a unitary business. Marriage is not a business relationship, but is a legally recognized 
personal relationship. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed. 1999). If a non-unitary 
business cannot be taxed on its out-of-state income generating activities, how then can a married 
couple be so taxed when one of them is not a resident of the state and does not engage in any 
related income generating activities in the state. 
The Parkers have found no case which compels a finding that a marriage is a "business" 
of any kind, unitary or otherwise. Indeed, universally, laws governing maxital property rights are 
referred to as either "community property" or "separate property" laws. The marriage is referred 
to as a community for property rights purposes, not a corporation or a business. That is, the 
emphasis in each state is on the ownership of property, income, and debts, and every state 
examined by the Parkers operating under community property laws has provisions allowing for 
opting out of community property status in whole or part, including Idaho. Such opt outs appear 
to have no legal effect on the marriage other than on the ownership issues. 
Further, married persons do not, at least in Idaho, file a business return as would a 
corporation, but instead file individual tax returns. Depending on how they filed at the federal 
level, they file either separate returns or a joint return. In fact, when a couple get married in 
Idaho, no incorporation papers are filed with the Idaho Secretary of State. There are no articles of 
incorporation, no boards of directors, no shares, nor any of the trappings or indicia of corporate 
status. They are not required to file annual reports with the Secretary of State or to otherwise 
behave as though carrying on a business or trade. 
In fact, Idaho Code 5 63-3027(a)(l) specifically defines business income as: 
"[~ncome arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the 
taxpayers' trade or business and includes income from the acquisition, 
management, or disposition of tangible and intangible property when such 
acquisition, management, or disposition constitute[s] integral or necessary parts of 
the taxpayers' trade or business operations. Gains or losses and dividend and 
interest income from stock and securities of any foreign or domestic corporation 
shall be presumed to be income .from intangible property, the acquisition, 
management, or disposition of which constitute an integral part of the taxpayers' 
trade or business; such presumption may only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary." 
A marriage cannot be said in reason to have "a trade or business." To be sure, each 
person in the marriage may have a trade or business and derive income therefrom. They may 
even join together in a trade or business, but that trade or business cannot be said to be the 
marriage. In fact, even if one could characterize a marriage as a "business" in some esoteric 
sense, it could hardly be said to be a unitary business within the meaning of Mobil Oil Corp. or 
cases cited therein or in ASARCO. As a statutory matter, by analogy (which should not be taken 
too far), each of the individuals in the marriage is statutorily compelled to pay a dividend of half 
of his or her income to the other member, in which case, ASARCO and Coiztaiver Corp. of 
America, supra., compel a different result from that imposed by the District Court. As discussed 
supra, under neither the Due Process Clause nor that Commerce Clause of the Constitution, may 
Idaho, when imposing an income-based tax, tax value earned outside its borders except in the 
case of a more or less integrated business enterprise operating in more than one state. @. at Page 
164. As the Supreme Court noted, absent this connection the minimal contacts necessary to 
permit taxation of the amounts (as relied on by the District Court) do not exist. "In such a 
situation, it is not true that 'the state has given anything for which it can ask return'." ASARCO, 
458 U.S., at Page 326. In no marriage can it be said that, as a legal matter, the contributions to 
income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of 
scale exist which would make it fair to impose a tax on discrete income producing activities in 
Nevada which, in any event, have no connection to similar activities in Idaho. 
4) MR. PARKER LACKS NEXUS WITH IDAHO 
The Tax Commission had requested, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f), a continuance to 
determine whether Mr. Parker had sufficient contacts with the state of Idaho for the tax 
imposition to satisfy United States Constitutional requirements. The District Court denied this 
request because it held that the record contained enough evidence establishing Mr. Parker's 
minimum contacts with the state of Idaho. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 44). The District Court relied solely on 
application of community law principles and determined these minimum contacts to be his 
apportioned interest in income producing property located within Idaho, plus the District Court 
concluded that half of the marital community was domiciled in Idaho. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 43). The 
Parkers respecthlly submit that the District Court erred as a matter of law in making this 
detemination because, other than through the application of community law principles, Mr. 
Parker did not have any, let alone sufficient, minimum contacts with Idaho. 
The parties stipulated that Mr. Parker was aNevada domiciliary during the entire period 
at issue. 74 of Stipulated Facts. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 22B). Therefore, his domicile does not provide the 
necessary substantial nexus. 
Next, we look to the source of his wages. Mr. Parker testified that his wages were not 
Idaho sourced, and that he did not receive any other Idaho-sourced income. 76 of David Parker 
Affidavit. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 26). Therefore, neither his wages nor any alleged Idaho source income 
provide the necessary minimum contacts. 
Looking at the challenged Amended Decision, it is clear that the Tax Commission 
rejected the Parkers' representative's request to treat the income as the separate property of each 
spouse according to which one was named as the owner of the account or other instrument giving 
rise to the income. (R. Vol. I, Pg. 20). Instead, the Tax Commission wrote: "In attributing certain 
interest income from financial institutions, the petitioners originally reported some of this as 
being attributable solely to Idaho. The attribution of this income was not changed by the auditor. 
The income as community property should be attributed equally to each spouse and to the 
domicile of each of the petitioners." (R. Vol. I, Pg.22T). 
This action by the Tax Commission does not create the necessary minimum contacts 
because there has been no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Parker owns any realty in Idaho or had 
any other actual contacts with Idaho other than the Tax Commission's application of community 
law principles. See for example, Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37,57 (1920)("As to nonresidents, 
the jurisdiction extends only to their property owned within the state and their business, trade, or 
profession carried on therein, and the tax is only on such income as is derived from those 
sources."). 
Additionally, in so apportioning this Idaho sourced income, the Tax Commission appears 
to be taking an inconsistent view. Mrs. Parker's wages are clearly Idaho sourced income, as was 
the financial institution's interest income. Yet, the Tax Commission apportioned 50% of the 
Idaho sourced income to Mr. Parker in Nevada but not 50% of Mrs. Parker's Idaho sourced 
wages. 
E) THE TAX COMMISSION'S METHOD OF TAXATION VIOLATES THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE 
The United States Constitution grants to Congress the power to "regulate Commerce, ... 
among the several states." Okla. T m  Comm'n v. Jeferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175,179 (1995). 
Within the express grant is a negative command, commonly referred to as the "Dormant 
Commerce Clause" which prohibits a State from imposing any tax that discriminates against 
interstate commerce or out-of-state economic interests. a. Modern Dormant Commerce Clause 
principles in a four-part test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 US. 274,279 
(1977), and first recognized and applied by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609,617 (1981). 
In addressing the Parkers' Commerce Clause arguments, the District Court cofrectly 
acknowledged that state regulation imposed on individual taxpayers, such as the Parkers, can 
implicate the Commerce Clause even where it does not directly tax a commercial activity or 
organization. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,300 (1997). With this 
recognition, the District Court's analysis turned to Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274,279 (1977), and it's four-part test that "the state tax must be: (1) applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus to the taxing state, (2) be fairly apportioned, (3) not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and (4) be fairly related to the services provided by the state." Page 43-44 of 
Record. 
The District Court rejected the Parkers' Commerce Clause challenge and held that since 
Nevada does not have an income tax, the Tax Commission's method of taxing Mr. Parker's 
income did not cause actual double taxation in violation of the "fairly apportioned" component of 
Complete Auto. The District Court concluded by stating that since no actual double taxation 
existed, it would provide no further comment on &s issue because to do so would constitute a 
violation of the prohibition against rendering an advisory opinion. Id. With all due respect, the 
District Court erred in its analysis and conclusion. 
It is universally recognized that the fair apportionment analysis looks to both "internal 
consistency" and "external consistency." "Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition 
of a tax identical to the one in question by every other State would add no burden to interstate 
commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear." Oklahoma Tux Comrn'n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,185 (1995). The internal consistency test "simply looks to the structure 
of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in the Union would place 
interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate." Id. 
In discussing the fairly apportioned component, the United States Supreme Court made it 
known, in Jefferson Lines, that "This principle of fair share is the lineal descendant of Western 
Live Stock's (Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938)) prohibition of 
multiple taxation, which is threatened whenever one State's act of overreaching combines with 
the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed: the portion of value 
by which one State exceeded its fair share would be taxed again by a State properly laying claim 
to it." Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S., at Pages 184-1 85. Simply stated, the "internal consistency" test 
asks "What would happen if all States did the same?" Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,261 
(1989), arming 255 Mich. App. 589, 662 N.W.2d 784 (2003). 
Therefore, the District Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the Tax 
Commission's method of taxation did not m afoul of Commerce Clause protections because 
double taxation did not actually result. 
Continuing, the Tax Commission's method of imposing Idaho income tax on the Parkers 
clearly violates the fair apportionment prong of Complete Auto. The Tax Commission combined 
community property concepts with principles of domicile to impose tax on 100% of Mrs. 
Parker's Idaho wages and 50% of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages. If Nevada, or any other state, 
imposed an income tax in the same manner as the Tax Commission, then 100% of Mr. Parker's 
income and 50% of Mrs. Parker's income would be subjected to the tax. Looking at the end 
result of both State's action clearly shows that 150% of the Parkers' combined income would be 
taxed rather than 100%. Therefore, this additional one-half of the Parkers' income being taxed 
clearly constitutes double taxation and, as such, violates the Commerce Clause requirement of 
being fairly apportioned. 
This same conclusion was reached by the California Appellate Court in Northwest 
Energetic Services, LLC v. California Frarzchise Tax Board, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Cal. App. 1st 
Dist. 2008). The Appellate Court addressed the issue as to whether or not a levy on limited 
liability companies registered to do business in California was unconstitutional because the levy 
was measured by the limited liability company's total income, regardless of whether the income 
derived &om or is attributable to business within the state. In holding that the imposition of the 
Levy violated the "internal consistency" prong, the Court wrote that "here, if the Levy were 
replicated in every state, an LLC engaging in business in multiple states with the same total 
income as Northwest would pay the maximum Levy in every state in which it did business or 
registered to do business. An LLC operating only in one state would pay the maximum Levy only 
once. Thus, the Levy places a greater burden on interstate commerce than intrastate commerce." 
Northwest Energetic Services, 71 Cal. Rptr.3d, at Page 658. 
F) APPLICABLE COMMUNITY LAW PRINCIPLES 
In its Amended Decision the Tax Commission concluded that the community property 
laws applied to the computation of the Parkers' taxable income. The Tax Commission, after 
quoting Idaho Code 532-906 and Nevada Revised Statute 5123.220, wrote: 
There is no indication of any writing between the spouses which would preclude the 
general rules of the community property laws of the two states from governing the 
ownership of the income in question. There also is no indication that any of the income- 
producing property is other than community property. Therefore, the Commission 
concludes that the community property laws should govern the ownership of the income 
in question. 
(R. Vol. I, Page ) 
In granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission, the District Court only 
discussed the Idaho community property law, not Nevada community property law. (R. Vol. I, 
Pg. 42). More specifically, the District Court stated all property acquired after marriage ins 
presumed to be community property, even when the spouses are separated. @. In rendering this 
decision, as applicable to Mr. Parker who was aNevada domiciliary, the District Court erred 
because it should have stated whether or not Nevada law applied to Mr. Parker as the Tax 
Commission had done in its Amended Decision. 
Now, assuming for purposes of argument that this Court determines that the Due Process 
Clause and Commerce Clause requirements have been satisfied, that LC. 563-3002 does not 
incorporate federal equitable relief provision, and that community law principles do not require 
apportionment of 50% of Mrs. Parker's income to Nevada and 50% of Mr. Parker's income to 
Idaho, then the Parkers submit that: (1) the Tax Commission's method of applying Nevada 
community law in its Amended Decision is actually the correct method; and, (2) recognizing 
such, the District Court should have discussed Nevada Revised Statute $123.220, rather than 
relying solely on Idaho community property law, because Mr. Parker was a Nevada domiciliary. 
Should this Court adopt the Tax Commission's reasoning, then this Court should remand the 
case to the District Court for a determination as to whether or not Mr. and Mrs. Parker had 
separated so that Nevada law would consider the wages of each to be their respective sole and 
separate property. To begin this analysis, we start with the case of Keller v. Depf. of Revenue, 
642 P.2d 284 (Ore. 1982), a case that applied the same basic legal analysis as the Tax 
Commission did in its Amended Decision. Even though the Keller case has never, to Parkers' 
research, been cited by any other court, it does reflect the initial legal reasoning engaged in by the 
Tax Commission. Furthermore, the Parkers will set forth their reasoning as to why the Keller 
case is distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In KelEer the plaintiff was an Oregon resident whose husband lived and worked in the 
state of Washington. There was no marital discord. The Kellers filed joint federal income returns 
and Mrs. Keller filed separate Oregon returns only reporting her Oregon income. The Oregon 
Tax Court affirmed inclusion of one-half of Mr. Keller's income with Mrs. Keller's Oregon 
income. Washington state did not have an income tax. 
On appeal the Kellers presented two arguments. First, under Washington community 
property law, Mrs. Keller acquired no interest in her husband's earnings. Second, the Oregon 
Revenue Department's actions deprived Mrs. Keller of Equal Protection under the Oregon 
Constitution. No federal constitutional violations were either alleged or addressed by the Oregon 
Supreme Court. 
The Oregon Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that Oregon imposes a tax on 
residents measured by taxable income wherever derived. Keller, 642 P.2d, at Page 286. The 
Court then wrote that taxable income in Oregon is defined as federal taxable income with certain 
modifications. Id. And, when one spouse lives in Oregon and files a separate return, the Oregon 
tax is computed as if the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income had been determined 
separately. Id. The Court then wrote that a Rule of the Department of Revenue declares that "[aln 
Oregon taxpayer whose spouse resides in a community property state is taxable upon a share of 
his spouse's community property income which is considered earned by the Oregon taxpayer 
according to the laws of the community property state. OAR 150-3 16.048." IQr 
The Oregon Supreme Court then looked to Washington state community property law to 
determine the extent of Mrs. Keller's interest in Mr. Keller's income. The court looked 
specifically at the provisions of Washington law that provided the earnings of each spouse are 
separate property "[wlhen a husband and wife are living separate and apart. (Citation omitted)." 
& at Pages 286-287. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Kellers did not live separate and 
apart due to an abandonment of the marriage, and, therefore, Mrs. Keller had a one-half interest 
in Mr. Keller's Washington wages. Id., at Pages 288. 
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the Keller's argument that the Oregon tax violated 
provisions of the Oregon Constitution. The court rejected this argument for the reasons that it had 
rejected their argument regarding domicile and Washington community property law. a., at 
Pages 288-289. 
The Parkers submit that this Court should not follow the result in Keller for several 
reasons. First, unlike Oregon, Idaho does not have any specific rule or regulation addressing their 
fact pattern. Secondly, the Kellers did not raise the argument that the Oregon method of taxation 
violated either the Due Process Clause or Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
As quoted by the Tax Commission's Amended Decision, Nevada Revised Statute 
$123.220 provides that all property, including wages, acquired after marriage, unless provided 
otherwise by the parties' written agreement or appropriate judicial decree, is presumed to be 
community property. To overcome this presumption, "clear and convincing" proof is required. 
Todkill v. Todkill, 495 P.2d 629 (Nev. 1972). 
The Nevada Supreme Court has clearly and unequivocally held that an oral agreement to 
treat property as sole and separate property of the particular spouse will satise the requirements 
of Nevada Revised Statute $123.220. See for example Jensen v. Jensen, 753 P.2d 342 (Nev. 
1988)(The Nevada Supreme Court upheld an oral and factual modification of an ante-nuptial 
agreement to treat income as sole and separate property.). Estoppel can also act as a means of 
transmuting community property into separate property. Anderson v. Anderson, 816 P.2d 463 
(Nev. 1991). 
Because "[tlhe opinion of either spouse is of no weight in determining whether property 
is community or separate, Bankv. Milisch, 52 Nev. 178,283 P. 913 (1930): Verheyden v. 
Verheyden, 757 P.2d 1328,1331 (Nev. 1988), the Nevada Supreme Court has held that evidence 
of such transmutation together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom can be 
deemed clear and convincing. Todkill v. TodMl, 495 P.2d 629,632 (Nev. 1972). 
Mr. Parker's Affidavit sets forth facts, together with the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, that clearly show that he was separated from Mrs. Parker, as contemplated by 
Nevada Revised Statute $ 123.220 and interpretive case law, during the taxable years at issue. Mr. 
Parker was a Nevada domiciliary, his wages were sufficient to meet all of his financial needs, and 
he did not receive any financial assistance &om Mrs. Parker. In establishing his lack of minimum 
contacts with Idaho, the same facts also support the determination that he had separated from 
Mrs. Parker for all purposes. 
N) CONCLUSION 
The Parkers respectfully submit that the District Court erred in the following manner and, 
when appropriate, recommends certain corrective action: (1) the District Court should have 
excluded 724 of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit in conducting its analysis and rendering its Decision; (2) 
the District Court erred in characterizimg $6015 as an "exemption" and, as such, its relief could 
not be incorporated into Idaho income tax law. Relying on its prior precedent, this Court should 
hold that the equitable relief provided by $6015 is incorporated by means of LC. $63-3002, and 
that it provides such equitable relief to the Parkers and other taxpayers similarly situated. (3) 
Alternatively, this Court can hold that the Tax Commission's method of subjecting Mr. Parker's 
Nevada wages to Idaho income tax violates Due Process andfor Commerce Clause protections. 
As proper relief, the Court should then hold that the proper method of addressing the Parkers' 
situation is this: apply community law principles and apportion one-half of Mrs. Parker's income 
to Nevada and one-half of Mr. Parker's Nevada income to Idaho; or, alternatively, subject 100% 
of Mrs. Parker's Idaho wages to income tax based on residency and exclude all of Mr. Parker's 
Nevada wages due to lack of nexus. (4) This Court could adopt the reasoning of the Tax 
Commission, as reflected in the Keller holding, and remand the matter for a factual determination 
as to whether or not Mr. Parker had separated fiom Mrs. Parker as contemplated by Nevada 
community property law. 
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